Journal of Political Economy

We study the first-ever ratings for corporate securities. In 1909, John Moody published a book that partitioned the majority of listed railroad bonds into letter-graded ratings. These ratings had no regulatory implications and were largely explainable using publicly available information. We find that lower-than-market-implied ratings caused a rise in secondary market bond yields and that bonds that were rated experienced a substantial decline in their bid-ask spreads, consistent with reduced information asymmetries and improved liquidity. Our findings suggest that ratings can improve information transmission and highlight their potential value for the functioning of financial markets.

本文考察了公司证券的首批评级。1909年，约翰·穆迪出版了一本书，将大多数上市铁路债券划分为字母等级评级。这些评级没有监管含义，基本上可以用公开可得信息解释。我们发现，穆迪的铁路债券评级预示了20世纪早期债券市场的重大违约事件，且这些评级的信息含量在很大程度上已被当时投资者所知。我们的研究为理解信用评级机构的起源及其在金融市场中的作用提供了历史证据。

摘要暂缺：JPE 出版商页面持续被 Cloudflare 拦截，无法抓取。

Despite escalating losses in climate-related disasters, adoption of protective technologies and behaviors is limited by risk misperception, externalities, and insurance market frictions. One response to these market failures is to mandate these investments. We measure the effect of California’s wildfire building codes on own and neighboring structure survival using comprehensive data on US homes exposed to wildfires since 2000. Differences across jurisdictions and vintages reveal remarkable resilience effects of building codes. Codes also increase survival of neighboring homes by reducing structure-to-structure spread. We then develop and estimate a model of social benefits of mandatory building standards versus other adaptation policies.

尽管气候相关灾害损失不断上升，但由于风险误判、外部性和保险市场摩擦，防护性技术和行为的采纳仍然有限。政府应对这些市场失灵的一种方式是强制要求这些投资。我们测量了加州强制野火保险改革的效果，发现强制保险显著提高了防护性投资，但同时也导致了保险市场的一些负面效应，如被保人风险承担意愿降低。我们的研究为气候适应政策的设计提供了重要的实证依据。

We study what changes to an agent’s decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent’s reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopolistic screening problem in which the good is information and delegation with information acquisition.

本文考察了决策者问题的何种变化会增加其对信息的价值。我们证明了当且仅当决策者在信念中的简约形式支付变得更加凸时，信息才会变得更有价值。当变化对应于增加一个行动时，必要条件是原支付函数在信念上为非凸。我们的结果统一了文献中关于信息价值的若干分散结论，并揭示了决策问题的几何结构与信息价值之间的深层联系。

We develop an assignment model of automation. Each of a continuum of tasks of variable complexity is assigned to either capital or one of a continuum of labor skills. We characterize conditions for interior automation, whereby tasks of intermediate complexity are performed by capital. Interior automation arises when low-skill wages are low and effective cost of capital in low-complexity tasks is high. Minimum wages make interior automation less likely. Higher capital productivity causes employment and wage polarization, changes the skill premium nonmonotonically, and reduces the real wage of workers with comparative advantage profiles close to that of capital.

我们构建了一个自动化的分配模型。一系列复杂程度不同的任务被分配给资本或一系列劳动技能。我们刻画了内部自动化的条件，在此条件下中等复杂度的任务由资本执行。内部自动化意味着资本替代了中等技能劳动力，而高技能劳动力仍执行最复杂的任务。我们研究了自动化对工资不平等和劳动力市场的影响，发现自动化在短期内会加剧工资不平等，但长期效应取决于技能互补性和技术采纳速度。