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Market Power and Capital Constraints
市场势力与资本约束
E63, G12, G14, G23, G41, L13(财政与货币政策比较 / 资产定价 / 信息与市场效率 / 非银行金融机构 / 家庭金融 / 寡头垄断)
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231202 ↗摘要 Abstract
We explore how traders' equity capitalization influences asset prices in a framework that accounts for market power. In our model, traders with capital constraints engage in transactions in an imperfectly competitive market. We demonstrate that looser capital constraints elevate both asset prices and price impact, the latter diminishing market liquidity. Using Canadian Treasury auction data, we illustrate how to apply our model to quantify these effects. We estimate the shadow costs of capital constraints by leveraging a temporary policy exemption during 2020–2021. We show that while these constraints are only infrequently binding, their relative impact when activated can be sizable. (JEL E63, G12, G14, G23, G41, L13)
本文在一个考虑市场势力的框架中探讨交易者权益资本如何影响资产价格。在模型中,受资本约束的交易者在不完全竞争市场中进行交易。我们证明,放松资本约束会同时推高资产价格和价格冲击系数,后者会降低市场流动性。利用加拿大国债拍卖数据,我们展示了如何应用该模型来量化这些效应。借助2020-2021年间的一项临时政策豁免,我们估计了资本约束的影子成本。研究表明,尽管这些约束仅在少数情况下具有约束力,但一旦被激活,其相对影响可能相当可观。